The chapter examines the tensions between welfare states on the one hand and social Europe on the other and colliding principles in their historical setting. In particular, the chapter focuses on Social Services of General Interest (SSGI) as core institutions of the welfare state and the political response to the European impact on these public services, looking in particular at health care and long term care. The findings point out that that although Member States attempt to create 'safe havens' to protect their welfare policies from European law, these may not prove to be lasting firewalls against the 'creeping competences' of the European Union. Over time SSGI have become Europeanized, limiting the scope and policy options for national politicians and national administrations. Also the administrative space of SSGI is increasingly multi-level, forcing administrators at all levels to take EU rules into account, when welfare programs are designed, adopted and administered.
Introduction
The competence to decide on the content, scope and organization of welfare policies remains within national competence in the European Union (EU) as long as the exercise of that competence does not contradict EU law. The trick is to balance 'welfare sovereignty' and EU law; this constitutes a central dilemma for contemporary welfare states in the European Union. The dilemma has only intensified over the years.
Historically, the welfare state construction has been closely linked to the formation and consolidation of the nation-state. 1 The demarcation of the nation, and the territorial borders, of the state has traditionally defined social citizenship, i.e. who, when and where to be protected against social risks. In its gradual development, welfare came to constitute a decisive means of national integration, where material rights and obligations linked the state and civil society together.
Generally, the modern welfare has been proposed, created and developed for the nation, historically aiming at national integration and coherence:
... the welfare state has always been a national state and this connection is far from coincidental. One of the main factors impelling the development of welfare systems has been the desire on the part of governing authorities to promote national solidarity. From early days to late on, welfare systems were constructed as part of a more generalized process of state building. Who says welfare state says nationstate.
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From a formal point of view, Member States of the EU still possess social sovereignty. Despite a generally intensified process of European integration, social policies have long appeared as a 1 Eichenhofer 1999a; Ferrera 2003 . 2 Giddens 1994, pp. 136-137. remaining stronghold of the sovereign nation-state against the influence of EU law and policy -'an island beyond its reach '. 3 The historical meaning of the welfare state in part explains why European integration of welfare is ripe with tensions, contradictions and reluctance, since it challenges the original national embeddedness of welfare. From a historical point of view, welfare states and social Europe contradict one another. National welfare states are underpinned by a logic of 'closure' whereas the EU is guided by a logic of 'opening'. 4 Whether the tensions between those two logics can somehow meet and reconcile in future social Europe remains to be seen.
This chapter focuses on the tensions between welfare states on the one hand and social Europe on the other, but also on how the two entities have gradually been brought together, albeit sometimes in an incoherent and conflicting manner. In particular, the chapter focuses on Social Services of General Interest (SSGI) as core institutions of the welfare state and the political response to the European impact on these public services. Section two below examines Social Europe, its scope and content. Section three turns to two specific welfare provisions, defined as social services of general interest; health care and long term care and examines the political response to their European integration. Section four analyzes the Europeanization of welfare. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided.
Social Europe
The existence and reach of social Europe has long been debated. Formally regarded, the organization of welfare continues to be a national prerogative, and 'social Europe' has been laid down as 'the road not taken'. 
Social Services of General Interest
The Although the Treaty sets out explicitly that non-economic social services 21 are special, and henceforth should be governed by special rules, they are de facto integrated and increasingly part of the supranational regulatory scope as the case-stories of health care and long-term care below details. These two social services, however, also bear witness of considerable political resistance and opposition along the process of integration.
Health care
Healthcare constitutes a social service of general interest 22 and its European integration has been greatly disputed as such. When it was laid down by the CJEU that health care is a service within the meaning of the Treaty, 23 it was by no means welcomed by the health ministers of the member states. The former German Minister of Health, Seehofer, argued quite impetuously in the wake of the judgments, saying that the member states had to overturn the rulings through a Treaty amendment and that Germany would not comply with the premises of the judgments. 24 The former
Minister found the Decker/Kohll case law 'revolutionary' and argued that if Germany adopted its premises, it would be a long-term threat to the sustainability of the German health system. 25 A for. 26 As we now know, such a Treaty amendment was never adopted. In the end, Member States did not prioritize the matter sufficiently when negotiating the Treaty of Nice, and the Treaty clarification exempting health care from the internal market was not inserted.
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This initial outburst was then later met by significant silence and a long period of no EU initiative.
The Member States evidently waited for the Commission to take the lead and point out some kind of direction. In the meantime, the CJEU moved further in its interpretations on patients' rights and cross border health care. 38 In the end, the Commission decided not to present the proposal.
However, it did not take more than half a year to ease the pressure on the Commission and to internally agree that a new proposal could be presented. On 2 July 2008, the Commission was successful in proposing the Directive on patient rights. 1) care subject to planning; hospitalization or use of highly specialized or cost-intensive medical infrastructure or equipment;
2) treatments involving a particular risk for the patient or the population;
3) providers raising serious concerns relating to quality and safety (Article 8 (2) of the Directive).
The process which finally reached a compromise on patient rights in cross border care substantiates that it took the representatives of the welfare states in the Council and a considerable part of European Parliamentarians quite some time to accept that health care as a service of general interest falls under the rules of the internal market. The politicians managed to negotiate some exemptions to the general rule of free movement, but the process also substantiates that despite such political reservations, it is now a European binding norm that health care constitutes a service within the meaning of the Treaty, with all its implications. The transposition and practical application of the directive in EU 27 will probably confirm that the reach of Social Europe goes much beyond what the member governments thought they signed to in the Council, March 2011.
Long term care
Long term care is another SSGI representing one if the core institutions of the welfare state. As with health care, its integration into EU law and policy has not been lightheartedly received by the Member States, which have long resisted that long term care should be regulated by the EU. The adoption of the patient rights' directive stands out as the recent example of the political 42 The preamble of the Directive lays down that; "Article 114 TFEU is the appropriate legal basis since the majority of the provisions of this Directive aim to improve the functioning of the internal market and the free movement of goods, persons and services" (para 2 of the preamble to Directive 2011/24/EU).
unwillingness to integrate long term care into the EU regulatory scope. 43 Despite such resistance, long term care is in fact regulated by EU rules, both through soft and hard law mechanisms.
Long term care benefit represents one of those social services which could not easily have been appreciated back when the first building blocks of social Europe was laid down. 44 The first regulations coordinating the social security rights of migrant workers did not include long term care
as part of their material scope. 45 Although today it is a core part of many European welfare states and a social benefit which receives much attention in times of an ageing European population, long term care took quite some time to be defined as a social service. 46 Despite the fact that 'reliance on care' has always existed as a social phenomenon, long term care did not figure as an independent or conceptualised social security risk in European or international conventions at the end of the 1970s. 47 Although by no means being a 'new' social task, it is a social service which, in some member states, has only lately become a part of public welfare, and has been institutionalized beyond the more immediate care provided by the family.
Today, however, long term care is regulated in the EU by the open method of coordination (omc).
This soft law measure focuses on the access, quality and sustainability and compares long term care policies in the Member States. Igl & Stadelmann 1998, p. 37. against sickness is compulsory insured in the long-term care scheme. The service was financed by contributions from both workers and employers. A social insurance member reliant on care became entitled to care in a nursing home or in his/her own home. If one should desire home care, the law also designated a possibility to choose either care as a benefit in kind, or as a monthly allowance, i.e. 'Pflegegeld' where an individual should purchase the care.
The monthly cash allowance quickly turned out to be the preferred form of home care. From the outset, 80% of those in home care chose the cash benefit. 54 However, the German politicians inserted a residence requirement in the law, setting out that the entitlement to the German 'Pflegegeld' was suspended if one took up residence abroad. The law thus demarcated the social provisions within national borders.
Whether the territorial demarcation of the German 'Pflegegeld' contradicted EU law was examined in Molenaar. 55 The case discussed the right to 'Pflegegeld' of Mr and Mrs Molenaar, a Dutch, German couple, working in Germany but living in France. They were both voluntarily insured against sickness in Germany and were, from January 1995, required to pay care insurance contributions, which they did. However, on application, they were informed by the competent German social security fund that they were not entitled to care insurance benefits due to their French residence.
The CJEU initiated its legal reasoning by referring to previous case law, stating that a benefit was to be regarded as a social security benefit if granted 'on the basis of a legally defined position and provided that it concerns one of the risks expressly listed in Article 4 (1)' of Regulation 1408/71 (para. 20 of the judgment). It added that the list of Article 4 (1), laying down the material scope of the regulation, was exhaustive, meaning that a branch of social security not mentioned in this article was not part of the regulatory scope. Long term care, such as the German 'Pflegeversicherung', was to be regarded as a sickness benefit within the meaning of Article 4 (1) (a) of Regulation 1408.
Having in this way included the care allowance within the material scope of 1408/71, the Court continued by examining whether the residence clause of German law could be justified against the Article 19 of Regulation 1408/71 made a distinction between benefits in kind and benefits in cash.
The competent institution was -and is -obliged to export sickness benefits in cash, but not benefit in kind. 56 Although a monthly cash allowance, 'Pflegegeld' was defined as a benefit in kind in German law, thus according to German law exempting it from exportability. From the drafting of the law, it appears to have been a deliberate and important consideration to define a de facto 'cash benefit' as a 'benefit in kind'. More specifically, the draft of the 'Pflegeversicherungsgesetz' defended the point of view, setting out that the care allowance constituted a 'benefit in kindsubstitute', a 'Sachleistungssurrogat'. 57 Nevertheless, the CJEU did not accept the national classification, but ruled that the German care allowance was indeed a benefit in cash (para. 36 of the judgment). As a consequence thereof, the overall conclusion was that the residence clause in German law conflicted with the principle of exportability of Regulation 1408/71.
The later case of Jauch 58 confirmed that long-term care falls within the scope of European law and is exportable in accordance herewith. Jauch concerned a German national, residing in Germany, but who had worked in Austria where he was affiliated to the social security scheme. The Austrian welfare state had, however, denied him long-term care, since he was not a habitual resident in Austria, and since Austria had specified that long-term care was a non-exportable social service.
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The Austrian government argued before the ECJ that because the member governments had decided that the benefit was exempted from exportability in accordance with a special rule of nonexportability inserted in Regulation 1408/71, the residence clause of Austrian law did not contravene EU law. The CJEU nevertheless ruled against the Austrian position, laying down that the character of the Austrian care allowance was no different from the German 'Pflegegeld';
. . . while care allowance may possibly have a different legal regime at the national level, it nevertheless remains of the same kind as the German care insurance benefits at issue in Molenaar, and is likewise granted objectively on the basis of a legally defined situation. -1901. 59 In concrete, the Austrian government had listed the benefit in Annex IIa of Regulation 1408/71, an Annex according to which the member governments in the Council of Ministers could insert certain benefits and thus make them nonexportable.
60 Para 26 .
The Molenaar and Jauch cases thus exemplify the attempts of Germany and Austria to exempt their welfare benefits from exportability, and so to speak to construct 'safe havens' in both national and EU law. 61 The cases also demonstrate that such 'safe havens' may not prove to be lasting firewalls around national social services in the long run. It can be argued that it becomes increasingly difficult to remain insulated on the island or in the 'safe haven', protected from the waves and dynamics of EU law.
The Europeanization of welfare
Health care and long term care both constitute social services of general interest which despite their traditional national boundedness, have been Europeanized. Europeanization has become a prominent analytical concept in European Union studies, defined a national change or processes of change caused by European integration. 62 When examining the impact of the EU on national politics and law, the Europeanization framework is helpful in setting out how national institutions are changed and why EU induced processes of change may not lead to convergence of domestic schemes. A Europeanization approach details that EU imperatives of change, be they case law from the CJEU, soft law mechanisms or the binding law of a Directive, do not automatically lead to national change. 63 Between an EU decision and de facto national change there is a long list of intervening variables which can be decisive to the actual EU impact. Judicial policy-making by means of CJEU case law may meet severe national obstacles and national re-interpretations of what the Court actually said, for which reason a significant case may not cause national change in the first place. On the other hand a case, or Directive, may be used strategically by domestic actors to justify why a reform is needed. 64 At a first glance the implementation of a Directive or Regulation may appear more straightforward and less open to national interpretations. Nevertheless, also the implementation of Council decision-making has proven to leave a significant scope of maneuver to the national executive when the measures are to be transposed into national law and practices. obligations. 68 Evaluation and enforcement at the end of the Europeanization process is thus fundamental to the extent to which a correct output is produced, and objectives and means become de facto impact. Together the four steps of Europeanization demonstrate that a process of EU induced change is far from automatic, but one with high thresholds and significant discretionary scope.
Figure 1 -Processes of welfare Europeanization 69
Over the years a significant Europeanization of welfare, and social services of general interest, has taken place. The market building process of the EU implies considerable social integration through the abolition of national barriers to the internal market. welfare, but added together the different bits and pieces of regulation becomes rather deep intervention in the administrative autonomy of the welfare state. The fact that social services fall within the scope of EU law implies that welfare administrations EU-wide have to take the rules into account, when welfare programmes are designed, adopted and administered. Additionally local public authorities have to apply EU rules on state aid and public procurement as well as administer their national laws of social services in accordance with EU law and policy. Thus we find Europeanization at the ultimate end of the administrative order, and the different units of local authorities are unlikely to posses the administrative capacity to take Europe into account in their daily practices. The lack of capacity is substantiated when public authorities notify the Commission that the application of the relevant EU rules to the national policies on social services causes problems.
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Local authorities especially have found the application difficult, viewing the different EU rules as an obstacle to organize and finance high quality social services. The Commission has responded that the difficulties are mainly caused by the lack of awareness or misinterpretation of the rules 76 Zuleeg 1998, p. 172. 77 See the Commission's Second Biennial Report on social services of general interest for this discussion: pp. 70-74. SEC (2010) 1284 final.
rather than the rules themselves. Disregarding such disagreements on reasons, the discussion substantiates that the administrative space of social services is no longer demarcated by national borders or to national communities, but is increasingly Europeanized -at all levels. 
Conclusions

